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Abstract: Global historical series spanning the last two centuries became recently available 
for primary energy consumption (PEC) and Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Here through a 
thorough analysis of the data, we propose a new, simple macroeconomic model whereby 
physical power fuels economic power. From 1820 to 1920, the linearity between global PEC 
and world GDP justifies basic equations where, originally, PEC incorporates unskilled human 
labor that consumes and converts food energy. In a consistent model, both physical capital and 
human capital are fed by PEC and store energy. In the following century, 1920-2016, GDP 
grows quicker than PEC, displaying periods of linearity of the two variables, separated by 
distinct jumps interpreted as radical technology shifts. The GDP to PEC ratio accumulates 
game-changing innovation, at an average growth rate proportional to PEC. These results seed 
alternative strategies for modelling and political management of the climate crisis and energy 
transition. 
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1. Introduction 
Energy resources are essential to provide wealth and quality of life to human societies1,2. Any 
economic process consumes energy, i.e. turns energy from a valuable, low-entropy form into a 
high-entropy, waste form1. Nowadays, fossil carbon sources still provide about 85% of primary 
energy consumption (PEC), remaining the principal driver of climate change through carbon 
dioxide (CO2) emissions, as identified since the 1970s3,4. New renewable energy technologies 
(photovoltaic panels, wind turbines), deployed for decades, recently became competitive with 
fossil fuels in several sectors: electricity5, urban mobility, thermal management of well-
insulated buildings, to name a few. Additional technologies in other services, notably chemical 
production from non-fossil resources like atmospheric CO2,6 justify strong programs to spread 
low-emission energies7. Despite propositions for all-out deployment of fossil-free sources8,9, 
these technologies, however crucial to our future wealth and wellbeing, still make a modest 
piece of the energy pie10. Currently, the macroeconomic field is lacking a universally accepted 
model that would give energy its fair share as a systemic input. Scenarios such as those 
reviewed by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change11 are based on “integrated 
assessment models” where energy is a mere sector of the economy, no larger than its nominal 
cost share (5 to 10%). Common economic textbooks12,13,14 generally script capital and labor as 
the two key factors of production, with a correction factor (residual in the neoclassical Solow 
model12-14) accounting for the positive effect of knowledge development. Ecological and 
biophysical economists have long criticized15,16 the negligible role given to energy as 
unrealistic, leveraging17,18 the evidence from national accounting (USA, Japan, Germany, etc.) 
that the energy consumption share is much more important in production functions, about as 
important as physical capital. Knowing this, macroeconomic models for the energy transition 
should cease ignoring the systemic role of energy embodied in capital and labor, as repeatedly 
demonstrated19,20,21,22.  
In this paper, we present a simple, energy-driven macroeconomic model to study the world 
economy, as an essential step to unravel the economy-environment nexus. Inspired by 
ecological economics1,15-22 and neoclassical macroeconomics12-14, this model aims at 
reconciling both schools. 
2. A new assessment of global production and energy data 
The time scale of the aggregated world economy involves decades: thus, its understanding can 
only rest on long-run observations, spanning centuries, as done for the climate system itself. 
Prompted by the current climate crisis and the emerging Anthropocene concept, developing 
and probing a new macroeconomic model makes sense from the recent availability of the 
thorough, painstaking data collections and authoritative  
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Fig. 1. Log-log plot of Global annual GDP Y  vs. Annual Primary Energy 
Consumption (PEC) E . GDP is in US$-2011 at parity of purchasing power (see 
appendix A). The time scale is marked as empty disks at decades 1820, 1830 up to 
2010. Energy aggregates all types of PEC, by humans as food, by draft animals as 
fodder, by diverse fireplaces or machines as fuels of any sort or wind or sun 
streams. In epoch 1, from 1820 to 1920, both Y and E  vary by a factor ~4; a 
dashed red line extrapolates their linear relation, unit slope in this log-log plot, 
through two successive factors 4. During the following century (epoch 2, 1920-
2016), Y grows quicker than E , while still following E  quasi linearly (unit slope 
e.g. marked by blue dotted lines) for periods of a few years. See §3.1 and §3.2 for 
explanation of both features. (1 Exajoule [EJ] is 1018 J; a Trillion $ equals 1012 $; a 
Terawatt [TW] is 1012 W). 
 
analyses of energy consumption23,24,25. The same holds for the estimates of global scale 
economic production in the long-run, pioneered by Angus Maddison26 and his successors27. 
appendix A discuss the various data sources. GDP data show an overall homogeneity while 
PEC sources suffer from some discrepancies: data from ref. 23 are used in this paper, preferred 
to other published series28,29 for reasons detailed in appendix A.  
 
Figure 1 shows the sustained growth pattern of the world annual PEC E  and GDP Y . During 
the last 200 years, Y  has grown by a factor of about 90, while PEC was multiplied by 40. The 
rates varied, but average annual growth never went under ~1 %, as seen in Table 1.  
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Table 1. Relative growth rates of annual PEC E , global population L  and world 
annual GDP Y  . 
 
periods 
 
Average Annual Growth Rate epochs
 (see 
Fig. 1) 
Relative growth E = 
Global 
PEC 
L = Global 
Population
Y = Global 
GDP 
1820-
1850 1.0% 0.5% 0.9% 
epoch 1
1920 1920 1920
1820 1820 1820
4.2 1.8 3.8
E L Y
E L Y
    
 
1850-
1870 1.1% 0.3% 1.2% 
1870-
1900 1.8% 0.7% 1.8% 
1900-
1920 1.9% 0.8% 1.5% 
1920-
1950 1.6% 1.0% 2.4% 
epoch 2 2016 2016 2016
1920 1920 1920
9.5 4.0 24
E L Y
E L Y
    1950-
1980 3.7% 1.9% 4.5% 
1980-
2016 1.9% 1.4% 3.1% 
 
The main point emerging from the careful treatment of GDP and PEC data (see details in 
appendix A) is the overall nearly linear trend on a log-log scale, over about 2 orders of 
magnitude, with a near-unity exponent23 in epoch 1 (1820-1920, Fig. 1 and Table 1). Note that 
in this epoch there are already boom and bust, but they only scatter the underlying time along 
the line. The trend differs in epoch 2 (1920-2016), consisting of a piecewise patch of segments 
of similar unit slope, interspersed with jumps. We now lay out a modelling frame that accounts 
for the distinct features of both epochs. 
3. Results and model significance 
3.1 Epoch 1 (1820-1920): reassessment of production factors 
The regular, linear relation observed in epoch 1 is interpreted using rather standard 
macroeconomic growth modeling12-14. Y  is described by an aggregate production function 
( , , )Y f K H L  which a priori depends on physical capital K , human capital30 H  and labor 
L , L  being usually identified with the population number. As introduced in appendix B, and 
generally adopted12-14, H  capitalizes the knowledge and skills of workers, while K  represents 
the tangible manufactured goods and infrastructure that support production. Our new viewpoint 
springs from the understanding that labor – unskilled human work fueled by food – assimilates 
to any of the other forms of energy consumption22 as the physics term “work” points out. Indeed 
25/08/2020 
5 
 
human labor has continuously been enhanced by new energy sources and converters throughout 
the Homo genus records. Enhancing L  by energy consumption per capita E
L
  , we consider 
a production function of the “Cobb-Douglas”12-14,18,22 type: 
1820 1820 1820 1820 1820 1820 1820 1820
Y K H L K H EA A
Y K H L K H E
     

                                  
 (1) 
where factors are normalized to their value in 1820.  ,   and  are the elasticities of 
production of K , H  and E ; inequalities 0 1  , 0 1   and 0 1   are standard 
hypotheses of diminishing returns; the condition 1      provides for constant return-to-
scale with respect to the three factors. The residual A ,12-14 also called total factor productivity, 
takes care of any discrepancy between the products of factors and Y . A  equals unity in 1820 
– by definition – and we keep it so for epoch 1. As we will discuss later, A evolves in epoch 2. 
K  and H  are stock variables whereas E  stands for a flow, the consumption of energy – 
actually a consumed power expressed in power units, Exajoule/year (EJ/year) or TW (1 
TW=31.6 EJ/year). At a given time, K  and H  “store” the results of history, actually through 
the integral of PEC E , but also through K  and H , previously invested into machine or plant 
building and worker formation. The dynamics in this system is set by the evolution equations 
of the accumulated capital K and H . K  (resp. H ) grows with time t as a share Ks Y  (resp. 
Hs Y ) of the production, saved and invested, while a part K K  (resp. H H ) is lost by 
depreciation.  
K K
dK s Y K
dt
   & H HdH s Y Hdt      (2) 
with Ks  and Hs  (dimensionless, between 0 and 1) and K  and H  (inverse times) the savings 
and depreciation rates. Equations 1 and 2, with 1A  , constitute a model12-14,30 worth further 
studies (cf. appendix B). However, aware of the scarcity of data for K and H  in epoch 1, we 
stick to simplicity, in a system where normalized production Y  is a function of only two 
factors,  
1
1820
Y J E
Y
Y
          (3) 
E is the normalized PEC, extrinsically defined, and J  is an aggregated capital factor 
accumulating according to:  
d s
dt
 J Y J        (4) 
J  is a combination of K  and H , and can stand for both of them, or for any factor that requires 
PEC to accumulate and build up. Equations 3 and 4 constitutes a simple system thoroughly 
studied in macroeconomics12-14. When E  grows exponentially as exp[ ]gt  (see exact solution 
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in appendix B), they give rise to a steady-state balanced growth path12-14 where both Y  and 
the aggregated factor J  grow exponentially at the same rate as E , maintaining a constant ratio 
s
g  
J
Y
, whatever the value of   in Eq. (3). In a nutshell, as J  capitalizes production, it 
boils down to storage of energy.  
Epoch 1 in Fig. 1 evidences such a balanced growth phenomenon, with the iconic decades of 
the coal-iron-railway “development block” thoroughly described by Kander et al.24: coal 
transforms iron, iron makes rail and locomotives, railways transport coal, in a growing spiral 
fueled by coal burning. To grasp the specific role of K  and H  growth, it is interesting to take 
the log-differential of Eq. (1) which, since Y E  here, leads to K Y Y H
K Y Y H


       
. 
Since Piketty31 reports that global capital K  grows slightly quicker than Y  in epoch 1 (see ref. 
31, p. 196), we infer that H  should have experienced a slower growth than Y  in those periods, 
which is a testable assumption. It should translate into a variation of saving and/or depreciation 
parametersErreur ! Signet non défini.. 
 
3.2 Epoch 2 (1920-2016): how energy feeds Schumpeterian innovation 
In epoch 2, a different regime of economic growth settles. The 1920-1950 period, with the 
roaring twenties, Great Depression and WWII appears in Fig. 1 as a transient towards a new 
energy/GDP relation. After exploring some alternatives, we deduce from the structure of Fig. 1 
and the physical justification of the linearity of Y  and E  a closed-form relation applying to 
the whole timescale, which is a boldly simplified version of Eq. (1): 
1820 1820
Y EA
Y E
       or        AY E   ,     (5) 
The time-dependent residual A  carries the whole flow of innovation spurred by the use of 
energy – tapping new resources, efficiency gains in converting PEC to useful work21, inventing 
new conversion modes, machines, materials or distribution schemes – but also any 
revolutionary progress of universal knowledge (electricity, internal combustion engine, air 
travel). A  YE  can be considered as the normalized productivity of energy23. In Eq. 5, where 
the linearity between Y  and E  hides a relation like Eq. (1), H  and K  are implicitly present, 
merged into E  along the exponential, balanced growth path. A more complex modeling is 
explored in SM, keeping capital J , which turns out to produce similar results. 
There is a vast macroeconomic literature on such residuals in Cobb-Douglas-type production 
functions. We favor an endogenous definition of A ,32 and look for a simple factor dependency. 
Imitating similar considerations on the long run human history33, and guided by the linear Y  
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to E  relation at work during epoch 1, we merely conjecture proportionality between E  and 
the average growth rate of A  
[ ]dLog A
dt
 E ,       (6) 
which could also be written dA A
dt
  E Y . Since A  contains all irreversible progress 
eventually shared by the whole humanity, so-called nonrival goods, it seems logical that any 
effort (measured in energy unit) anywhere on the planet has the same average, long-term effect 
on A  growth. 
From Eq. (6), we derive 
1820
[ ] exp[ ]tA t dt  E  since [1820] 1A  . If one remembers that here 
E  contains unskilled labor L , then Eq. (6) resembles Kremer’s bold assumption33, i.e. that dA
dt
 
was roughly proportional to LA . Figure 2 shows that, between A  Y E  and the time integral 
of PEC (
1820
t
dt E ), an exponential relation holds from 1930 on, with 10 00046 year  A  (this 
value hinges on the 1820 normalization of PEC in E ), hence the nonlinear skew only in epoch 
2. We insist once again that the time integral yields a bona fide energy, since the PEC E  is an 
energy flow, a physical power indeed. During the 1920s and 1930s, Y E  jumps from the epoch 
1 conditions to the new epoch 2 regime, with the full-fledged range of modern techniques 
substituting older ones. Projecting the exponential relation between A  and 
1820
t
dt E  to the past, 
we see that the new regime integrates the effect of energy consumption on invention from the 
beginning of 19th century. Innovation in energy efficiency, and introduction of new machines 
etc. existed in epoch 1. Its first 50 years, described as the age of steam and railways, would 
rightly be characterized by a single trend in energy usage, with the deployment of steel and 
electrical power in the 1870s and 1880s qualifying as a new stage of industrial revolution2,21,34. 
However, these new devices and industrial organization did not change the overall energy 
efficiency of the global economic system, maybe because a higher amount of energy had to be 
invested in the machines. Actually, table 1 shows that the growth rate of PEC grew steadily 
throughout epoch 1, evidencing a global rebound effect prompting the addition of energy 
thirsty processes. We would interpret this in saying that radical innovation was hindered in 
1820-1920 and its path suddenly tipped in the 1920s, spurred in all domains from e.g., air 
transport to agriculture35 and to energy distribution. Several successive jumps occurred during 
epoch 2. In the second half of the 20th century, A grows by steps of a few percent as shown by 
the peaks of annual A
A
  in Fig. 3. We account for these as radical, “Schumpeterian” technology 
shifts2,21, bringing a sudden increase in energy efficiency by the abrupt replacement of less 
efficient schemes or devices (even though singling out specific items, however iconic, is 
irrelevant, as triggering effects arise from their intertwined use). However, in the last 10 years, 
the growth of A  tends to be more regular, maybe revealing a more decentralized innovation 
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system. Nevertheless, during the whole 90 last years to date of epoch 2, the quantitative 
dependency of economic growth on energy does not experience any change, thus following 
Eq. (5) recapped as 
1820
1820 1820 1820
exp dt[ ]tY E E
Y E E
       (7) 
Visually, we refer to the inset of Fig. 2 where we fit with Eq. (7) the data from Fig. 1. 
 
 
Fig. 2. Semilog plot of the residual A , cf. Eq. (5), vs. the time integral of PEC, 
normalized to [1820]E . An exponential relation holds between 1930 and the 
present. From the beginning of 20th century, A  jumps from its previous value of 1 
in the 19th century to the new regime. The exponential fit is done between 1926 and 
2016. Decennial data are marked with black circles. The inset shows the data of 
Fig. 1 fitted with Eq. (7). 
 
Let us now comment Fig. 3 in more details with its peaks in the residual’s growth A
A
 , plotted 
for epoch 2 as well as its three-years running average. Apart from the 1940 and 1945 expected 
dips (obvious for WWII, whereby all factors including knowledge concur to physically destroy 
belligerents capital, e.g., energy networks, and labor), the average is around 1% - see the dashed 
line  E  in Fig. 3 - with a baseline around 0.5%. But the Schumpeterian peaks appear as well, 
spurring typical booms of 1.5-2% extra growth in the moving average. We shall argue 
elsewhere about the collective “swarming” nature of these booms, as no single sector of 
economy can support it alone, mainly because epoch 2 economic success spawns so many new 
objects36.  
3.3 Prospective trajectories for the energy transition 
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Finally, a deceivingly simple exercise consists in prolonging the long-time trend with Eq. (7), 
ignoring the jumps. We acknowledge that the linear Y  to E  relation masks a complex function 
involving all capitalizing factors – see appendix B–. However we prefer a simple algebra that 
better emphasizes our scope, through the derivative form of Eq. (7) Y E
Y E
   E . Then, a 
business as usual scenario, shown as a black curve in Fig. 4, merely extrapolates the ~ 1.9% 
PEC growth observed during the last forty years. Fig. 4 also shows two other scenarios, better 
addressing the GDP-environment nexus. Firstly, allowing for a continued growth in PEC E  
during a short period (until 2040 in Fig. 4), we could envision a time when the GDP 
“overgrowth”  E is large enough to sever any further PEC growth. This scenario would 
eventually usher into a new circular economy era, whereby GDP growth solely results from 
game-changing innovations (vertical blue segment till 2100). Secondly, Eq. (7) could also 
introduce a degrowth trajectory, whereby E  decreases while Y  is maintained constant from a 
future time 0t  (2040 again in Fig. 4). Such a trend in Eq. (7) would induce an algebraic decay 
of PEC 
  1
18 00 2
01 t tE
EE
      , innovation gains compensating for capital and PEC degrowth. 
These stylized scenarios are meant as draft tools to elaborate policies at a regional or global 
level, adding to recent work on a possible decoupling of GDP from resources consumption37,38.  
4. Conclusions  
The tale of epoch 1 is an energy-geared capital accumulation ( K  and H ) while epoch 2 sees 
game-changing innovation enhancing the impact of PEC. This double role of energy 
consumption, at the time of disquieting growth externalities in climate, biodiversity, etc., seems 
to us as a key driver worth considering to address the economy-environment nexus. Thanks to 
its dual inspiration from ecological economics1,15-22 and neoclassical macroeconomics12-
14,30,32,33, substantiated by historical accounts2,23-26,28,29,31,34, our model offers an opportunity for 
reconciling both schools. It shall also foster operational tools to manage the planet’s human 
future, part of a conversation on a desirable energy transition trajectory. In addition to taking 
into account the energy-driven mechanisms suggested by this study, an improved model might 
add money and financial flows as effective levers for capital and knowledge in essential global 
shifts34.  
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Fig. 3. Annual relative growth rate of A , residual carrying the effect of 
innovation on GDP, plotted vs the time integral of consumed energy, in epoch 2 
(1926-2016). Jumps identified in Fig. 1 are evidenced here as peaks of A
A
 . Five 
of these peaks are marked with the years of highest innovation growth, in 1964, 
1974, 1980, 1997 and 2006. Thin line: year to year relative growth rate of A ; thick 
line: 3-year average. Dashed line: linear relation in E  according to Eq. (7).  
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Fig. 4. Prospective in the E , Y  plane (loglog scales), according to Eq. (7). The 
black line is business-as-usual with PEC growing exponentially until 2100 at the 
same average rate as observed (red line) in 1980-2016. The two scenarios discussed 
in the text are illustrated, assuming a sharp turn, arbitrarily from 2040 on, with 
either constant PEC (dashed blue) or constant GDP (dotted green). 
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Appendices 
A. Choice and description of historical series 
In appendix A, we present the various sources of historical series for primary energy 
consumption (PEC) and GDP, and justify the choice that we made among them. 
A.1. Global primary energy consumption (PEC) 
We have been using Paolo Malanima’s recently published (Supplementary materials and 
downloadable database in ref. 23) database, which compiles global primary energy 
consumption (PEC) of all energy types and sources from 1820 to 2016. Previously, the 19th 
century period was described only by scarce or partial data, apart from a compilation by 
Victor Court28 that was also considered for our work (See appendix of ref. 28 p. 216-224 for 
the database), and will be compared to ref. 23 and its supplementary materials in the 
following. Malanima’s main paper23 rightly focusses onto PEC up to 1913, putting them in a 
geographical and historical perspective. The epoch 2 period (1920-2016) was much better 
known than epoch 1 (1820-1920), which justifies concentrating on the latter. However, 
Malanima’s database provide historical series for the whole period (1820-2016) for the 8 
comprehensive types of primary energy sources: 
1. food for humans 
2. fuelwood (which includes all solid biofuels, crop residues and derivates from wood, 
e.g. charcoal) 
3. fodder for working animals 
4. coal (all solid fossil fuels, also including peat) 
5. oil 
6. natural gas 
7. electricity (from water, wind, geo, Sun and other renewables) 
8. nuclear 
Since these data relate to primary energy, electricity from coal (resp. nuclear or other fossil 
sources) will appear as spent coal (resp. nuclear …) and be accounted as coal’s thermal 
energy content. Food, fuelwood and fodder (1 to 3) are traditional energy sources ; we call 
items 4 to 8 “modern energy sources”.  
The energy crisis in the seventies and concerns about global warming prompted the survey of 
fossil fuel consumption in the long run, as well as new fossil free alternatives. Etemad and 
Luciani published39 in 1991 an estimate of modern energy consumption since 1800 that has 
been used as a reference/basis by all authors afterwards. Fuelwood – solid biofuels – were 
discarded by most economic surveys up to the 2010s (being either invisible in trade or plainly 
ignored by surveys), although wood was a key energy resource. This is especially true during 
the first century of the industrial revolution, when wood fueled e.g. a major part of the 19th 
century development of the USA40 (cf. data on p.341), a would-be superpower. Smil29 added 
fuelwood (biomass) consumption since 1800, based on the work of Fernandes et al41 who 
assessed the use of biofuels from 1850 to 2000. Ref. 41 is the original source of most recent 
estimate of fuelwood/biofuel energy use. However, Fernandes et al provide a mass of 
consumed biofuels – wood, wood derivatives and crop residues - by macro-area (different 
geographical divisions than Malanima’s). A conversion coefficient is necessary to convert 
those masses into their primary energy content. Malanima used 12.5 MJ/kg (3000 kcal/kg) 
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for wood, which corresponds to wood with about 33% humidity. We come back to this a little 
later.  
Up to the collective work of Kander, Malanima and Warde24, most published estimates of 
energy consumption did not include food nor fodder. The inclusion of food – energy directly 
consumed by human workers – is crucial for a physical understanding of the role of energy in 
the economy, as previously claimed in §3. The same is true for fodder – energy necessary for 
draft animals to fuel their [horse] power – and fuelwood, which was the main energy source 
before the fossil fuels era. When draft animals replace humans, or when coal-fired locomotives 
replace horse traction, the economic impact must be assessed together with the increase of 
consumption that these changes induce.  
Before the inclusion of traditional energy sources into the aggregate consumption, the 
productivity of energy ( Y EA   in §3.2) showed a U-shape vs time on the long run – or an 
inverse U-shape for energy intensity of GDP ( 1 E YA  ) seen e.g. p. 350 of ref. 40. The 
inclusion of biofuels, fodder and food effectively levels the first part of the historical curve as 
seen at a global level in Fig. A1. A similar feature was also observed for energy intensity in 
the USA42, where the hitherto much commented increase of energy intensity disappears and 
reverses into a steady decrease when traditional energies are included. Whereas some 
individual countries still exhibit inverse U-shape for time series of energy intensity, it seems 
that this is a geographical bias: energy intensity never notably increases when consumption is 
averaged out on large enough areas (energy productivity never decreases). In the European 
case43, a similar but partial leveling of energy intensity was obtained by integrating 
international trade, i.e. subtracting from the UK and German account the energy spent for 
heavy industrial products sent abroad.  
Let us expand on the methodology of traditional fuel estimates. Whereas usage of modern 
sources of energy (4 to 8) has been accounted for and can be known at the level of individual 
countries, the consumption of those traditional sources of energy (1 to 3) has been 
estimated/assessed by Malanima23 on a macro-area basis (8 geographical macro-areas: Western 
Europe, Eastern Europe, etc.) as per capita averages. Apart from well tabulated modern energy 
consumption in the last 100 years, most data are assessed on a decennial basis, or every 5 
years39, and later interpolated on a yearly basis. For details, we refer the reader to Malanima’s 
work, which encompasses/compiles many bibliographical, industrial (e.g. BP) and 
administrative (e.g. FAO) sources. Malanima also discusses differences with previous long-
run estimates especially for fuelwood and compares his aggregate data with other available 
series. Victor Court also published a complete historical series covering 1800-2014 and the 
same categories of energy sources, but his work28 is not cited in Malanima’s23. Figure A2 
compares both aggregate data sets. 
Figure A2 shows that data from ref. 23 and 28 are very similar for the whole 20th and 21st 
centuries, and agree with other sources e.g. BP10. However, a noticeable relative gap shows up 
in the 19th century in Fig. A2. Separate comparisons of the eight energy types reveals that 
differences between the two sets come essentially from fuelwood. Figure A3 compares 
specifically those two energy resources. 
As previously mentioned, Malanima23, who does not cite Court28, compared his 
fuelwood data with Smil’s29 and noticed that these were much higher than his in the 19th 
century. The trouble with Court’s or Smil’s data for biofuels energy consumption – very 
similar, as shown in Fig. A3a – lies in the per capita numbers, shown in Fig. A4. We remark 
that Smil’s or Court’s data imply a decrease of per capita biofuel consumption from 1820 to 
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1880, at odds with what was happening in the USA, and in numerous other colonial regimes. 
Moreover, in per capita figures, Court’s average global biofuel energy consumption appears 
higher than the French total PEC per capita, which is very improbable, France being one of 
the dominant power in the beginning of the period and at the same time consuming mainly 
wood for heating and industry. 
As a whole, like Malanima, we conclude that Smil or Court estimated excessive energy 
quantities for traditional sources. Concerning food, however, there is a very good agreement 
between Malanima and Court. For this reason, we retain the data of ref. 23. We can take into 
account the uncertainty of fuelwood energy figures by using intervals instead of isolated 
numbers: the curve of Fig. 1, reproduced with error margins in Fig. A5 associated to a 10-50% 
humidity range, can be seen to shift only gently from this assumption, so such adjustments do 
not jeopardize our main messages. 
 
A.2 Global GDP 
Measurement of Gross National Products, then Gross Domestic Products, began during the 
1930s in the USA, and generalized progressively to other nations after WWII. Nowadays 
several international organization (the World bank, OECD, …) provide data for almost every 
country, which are the basis of a global world product44.  
Gross domestic product (GDP) for a geographical entity using only one currency (e.g. one 
country) during a short period (one year) is nearly merely a matter of accounting. “GDP is a 
monetary measure of the market value of all the final goods and services produced in a 
specific time period”45. However, when a complex ensemble of countries, using many 
different currencies, is surveyed on the long run, the accounting unit need to be corrected46 
for fluctuating exchange rates, inflation and differences in local purchasing power of specific 
moneys. After these diverse recalibrations of the measurement scale, GDP data are then said 
to be expressed in a constant currency, usually US$ of a given year, at parity of purchasing 
power. 
For period predating the existence of national accounting, historians try to determine first the 
income of an average individual in the said country and time. Per capita GDP data are then 
combined with population data (taken from population census, or from estimates for the 
periods when no population census was available) to retrieve national GDP, and then global 
GDP. Within about 1%, there is a consensus over world population estimates from the 
beginning of the 19th century. We have been using Malanima’s population series23.  
Angus Maddison26 published in 2008 a first estimate of the world product, or global GDP, at 
selected years since year since the beginning of the Common Era, and for our need: 1820, 
1870, 1900, 1913, 1940 and every year since 1950. After his passing away in 2010, his 
colleagues and followers at University of Groningen continued and improved the work in the 
so-called “Maddison Project”47. New global estimates of GDP were recently released by the 
team48,49. The database provides GDP per capita for nearly every country in US$ 2011 at 
Parity of Purchasing Power (US$2011 PPP) at selected years. After 1820, data begin to be 
denser in the (year, country) table. Two different GDP per capita estimates are given: 
RGDPNA, preferred by the authors for growth measurements, and CGDP, preferred to 
compare the level of development in different countries. Another database provides aggregate 
figures for continental regions and the entire world economy50, shown in Fig. A6. 
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To study the relations between energy consumption and GDP, yearly data are requested, 
or at least data at a regular decennial or half-decennial frequency. Thus, several scholars used 
the Maddison Project databases by year and country to establish yearly global GDP data, from 
187051, or 182023. Gapminder52, a well-established statistician enterprise founded by the late 
Hans Rosling, tackled the task of completing Maddison project database using also other 
sources: they recently released a new set of data53. The new global GDP per capita estimate is 
labeled gdppc_cppp. Multiplied by the world population, it provides a series of world GDP, 
shown in Fig. A6. Figure A6 compiles the available world GDP data, showing a convergence 
of numbers for the part after 1950, and very similar figures for the rest of the studied period. 
Minute differences observed between series in Fig. A6 would not change the appearance of 
Fig. 1, and the conclusion of the paper. We retained Gapminder series since it is the only one 
available on a yearly basis. 
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Fig. A1. 
 
 
Fig. A1: Effect of the inclusion of traditional energy sources (items 1 to 3, food, fuelwood and 
fodder) on Energy Intensity – i.e. the ratio of primary energy consumption (PEC) to GDP; same 
data as Fig. 1. Without traditional energies, the curve shows an inverse U-shape. This shape, 
found very often at the national level, especially when energy sources are only partially 
accounted for, was the subject of many comments and several theories. When traditional 
energies are included, plain line, the left part of the curve is levelled. 
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Fig. A2. 
 
 
 
Fig. A2: Global Aggregate Energy Consumption from different database - EJ/year. 
Comparison of Paolo Malanima’s database23, red line, with Victor Court’s data28, dashed 
black line, and another dataset available on the web, dotted blue line. Energy in EJ/year, 
semi-log scale. Court’s and Malanima’s data are very similar in the 20th and 21st centuries. 
Differences in the 19th century come mainly from fuelwood. Cf. §A.1 and Fig. A3 and A4. 
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Fig. A3. 
 
 
Fig. A3: comparison of traditional biomass energy data from Malanima23 and Court28. a: 
solid biofuels series, also compared to Smil’s estimate29 (which only considered solid fuels, 
not fodder) and to Fernandes’s41 mass of biofuels converted with 12.5 MJ/kg (and a 
proportional error bar of +/- 20%). b: fodder series. c: sum of solid fuels and fodder. Court’s 
data are very similar to Smil’s for solid fuels (a), much higher than Malanima’s, whereas the 
gap between Court’s and Malanima’s series is reversed for fodder (b). 
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Fig. A4. 
 
Fig. A4: traditional biomass energy per capita. Global data from ref. 23 and 28. French data 
from the Energy History Project54. Court’s average global bioenergy consumption per capita is 
higher than French consumption in the early 19th century, which appears very improbable.  
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Fig. A5. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. A5: reproduces Fig. 1, allowing for uncertainty in fuelwood energy. This uncertainty is 
expressed as variability in the average relative humidity [RH] retained to convert Fernandes 
et al.41 biomass data into energy. Using about 33% RH in wood, which translates into 12.5 
MJ/kg wood, Malanima established the aggregate energy consumption series that has been 
used in the main document. GDP (see §A.2 for a discussion of the data) is plotted vs  PEC. 
The green (respectively red) dashed (resp. point-dashed) line is the same GDP vs aggregate 
energy using 50% RH, i.e. 9.5 MJ/kg (resp. 10% RH, i.e. 17 MJ/kg). The relative horizontal 
gap between green and red lines is about ±20% around the Malanima’s series. The gap 
shrinks with time, and growth of modern energy consumption 
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Fig. A6. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. A6: time series of world GDP, from different sources. A6a: semi logarithmic scale, from 
1800 to 2016 ; A6b: linear scale, 1950-2016. All sources, except for Maddison 2008, use 
US$2001 PPP as unit. For Maddison 2008, we rescaled the original data expressed in US$ 
1990 dollars PPP to US$2011, using a 1.57 factor correcting inflation, obtained from US 
inflation data44. Apart from a proportional gap of about 10% – which may be due to an 
incorrect rescaling from our side – between Maddison 2008 and the three other sets of 
numbers, a general agreement is found. Note that world bank data begin in 1990. 
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B. modelling 
In appendix B, we go into more details about the resolution of differential equations 
employed in the main document. In the balanced growth case ( 1A ) corresponding to epoch 
1, we solve exactly the system of differential equations for a single capital factor J  in 
addition to PEC in the Cobb-Douglas function; we briefly discuss the case of two capital 
factors H  and K . When A  is variable, as in the case of epoch 2, the simplified form used in 
§3.2 (only energy was kept) is justified here by solving numerically a system with a single 
capital J  and PEC. 
B.1 balanced growth 
Here we give the basic elements to perform the macroeconomic modeling presented in the 
main document. We follow the spirit and basic mathematics of macroeconomic textbooks12-
14. Our first attempt used Labor L  and capital K  as production factors – as usually 
introduced in textbooks – together with PEC E : the production function is then a function of 
these three factors: 
Y K L E      (B.1) 
However, the linearity between Y  and E (such as in epoch 1), considered together with the 
investment equation K K
dK s Y K
dt
   (already seen in Eq. (2) [in appendix B, equations are 
marked with a B, as above for Eq. (B.1)]) ends up giving a minute role to L , in accordance 
with many studies in the past16-18. The disappearance of workers from the equation is 
counterintuitive and suggests an awkward relation to reality and entailed policies. Two steps 
heal this problem, as explained in the article. First of all, every human contribution is divided 
on the one hand into its mere brute force, unskilled labor which only depends on the energy 
converted by muscles, and on the other hand into a cultural part, prone to improve due to 
education and knowledge growth. Mankiw et al30 provided such a theory, where a human 
capital H  appears, at par with the physical, usual capital K : it is thus not a disappearance of 
Labor but a skill-based redefinition. A second step consists in integrating unskilled labor in 
the aggregate PEC. The combination of both steps produces Eq. (1), repeated here: 
1820 1820 1820 1820
Y K H EA
Y K H E
                  
  (1) 
with 1     . Equation (1) is combined with Eq. (2) 
K K
dK s Y K
dt
   & H HdH s Y Hdt    (2) 
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where Y  , K  and H  need to be normalized. Using  
1820
Y
Y
Y  , 
1820
K
K
K  , 
1820
H
H
H ,
1820
E
E
E  
it is straightforward to obtain the system: 
Y K H EA        (B.2a) 
K
Y KK K
K
sd
dt
      (B.2b) 
H
Y HH H
H
sd
dt
      (B.2c) 
with 1820
1820
K
K
Y
   and 1820
1820
H
H
Y
   the physical and human capital to production ratios at the 
beginning of the studied period. In the following, we will write KK
K
s   and 
H
H
H
s  . 
With  PEC growing exponentially as exp[ ]gt , it follows logically from the investment 
equations (2) that K  and H  will grow when energy is consumed. In macroeconomic models 
with labor L , it is usual to set exogenously an exponential growth of L , approximated by the 
global population. In our views, since energy is considered as the primary input, it suffices to 
set PEC growth. If we define an exponential growth of energy per capita, as exp[ ]g t , it then 
implies that population L  grows as  exp[ ]g g t . As usual in macroeconomic textbooks 
(e.g. ref. 12-14), it is practical to study ratios of production and capital(s) to PEC that are 
noted y E YE  , k E
K
E
  , h E HE . Eq. (B.2a) becomes, still with 1     .  
E E Ey Ak h
       (B.3a) 
Eq. (B.2b) can be rewritten 
2
E Y KK K E K E
E E E E E
K kd d d d
dt dt dt
k
dt
      
which simplifies into 
 E E EK Kd yd gt
k k       (B.3b) 
and the same holds for Eq. (B.2c) 
 E E EH Hd yd gt
h h       (B.3c) 
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For a constant 1A , and for constant values of parameters (saving and depreciation rates), 
the system of three equations (B.3) can be solved, at least numerically. The resolution of 
(B.3) with the two types of capital is beyond the scope of this appendix. The simpler case 
with a unique capital factor is used in §3.1 for a simpler discussion of the dynamics of capital 
formation, and solved exactly in the following to explicit the steady-state balanced growth 
conditions.  
We present here the basics of a simplified system with only one capital noted J  in 
normalized form. J  and Y  are linked by Eqs. (3) and (4), reproduced here: 
1Y J E       (3) 
d s
dt
 J Y J     (4) 
For constant values of s  and  , this system is exactly solvable; most textbooks present a 
discussion of the fixed point only, but an exact solution of the dynamics can also be found 
elsewhere13. A solution can be reached rather easily using production to energy ratio and 
capital to energy ratio, E
Y
E
y   and E E  
Jj  , with which the system is written:  
E Ey j
      (B.4a) 
 E E Edj sy g jdt        (B.4b) 
Combining both equations, we derive a differential equation on Ej  alone, 
 E E Edj sj g jdt        (B.5) 
A few trivial lines bring: 
   1 11
1
E
E
d j
g j s
dt



     (B.6) 
This first order equation on 1Ej
  is simplified by definition of a new variable 
1 (1- )( +g)t[t] Ej e
    , which obeys a trivial equation: 
  (1- )( +g)t1 .d s e
dt
       (B.7) 
easily integrated as 
 (1- )( +g)t[t] 1 1+gs e         (B.8) 
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since the initial condition (in 1820) is [0] 1  . It is now straightforward to express Ej  
 
1
1
-(1- )( +g)t -(1- )( +g)t[t] 1
+gE
s ej e
   

     
 (B.9) 
Capital to energy ratio tends exponentially to a constant 
1
1
+gE
* sj


     with characteristic 
time 
1
+g  . From Ej  and (B.4a), one easily obtains the production to energy ratio: 
  1-(1- )( +g)t -(1- )( +g)t[t] 1+gE sey e

   

     
 (B.10) 
which converges with a characteristic time  
1
+g   to  
1
+gE
* sy



         (B.11) 
In the asymptotic regime, called “balanced growth” in macroeconomic textbooks12-14, capital 
and production are proportional to PEC and grow exponentially according to exp[ ]gt .  
Their asymptotic ratio is 
1
1
1
+g
+g
+g
E
E
*
*
s
J s
Y s
j
y








     
   
 which is fixed when the parameters  , 
s  and g  are constant. Variation of these parameters, on the other hand, would produce an 
evolution of the capital to production ratio: its mathematical study calls for a new, more 
complex resolution of (B.4a) and (B.4b), which will not be tackled here. We will only give a 
brief discussion of epoch 1, extending the resolution of (B.4) to the case of the system (B.3) 
of three equations. 
Epoch 1 is characterized by such a balanced growth dynamics. Similarly to system (B.4), 
(B.3b) and (B.3c) imply the convergence of Ek  to a fixed point 
1
1 1
E
* K H
K Hg g
k
 
    
 

              
, while Eh  converges to 
1
1 1
E
* H K
H K
h
g g
 
    
 

          
   
. Compared to the simpler case with one capital, the dynamics will be made richer due to 
several different characteristic times of convergence. Since empirical data imply that Ey  is 
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constant, 1820
1820
1E
EY
Y
y
E
  , the actual asymptotic relations can be expressed, without much 
surprise, by simpler relations, namely: *E K
Kg
k     and 
*
E
H
H
h
g

  . Reintroducing the 
non-normalized K  and H , as well as Y  and E , remembering 1820
1820
K
K
Y
   and KK
K
s  , we 
retrieve K
KY g
sK
   the fixed-point ratio of physical capital to production, which goes also 
here with the same relation for the human capital H
HY g
sH
  . 
 
B.2 case of a variable A  in epoch 2 
In epoch 2, there is no more linearity of GDP with PEC. This can be modeled with a variable 
A  in Eq. (1). In §3.2, this situation is studied in a very simplified version where the capital 
factors K  and H  are put aside, and where E  only is kept: see Eq. (5) to (7). Here we 
consider a compromise solution, extending the single capital model (Eq. (3) and (4)) to the 
case of a variable residual A .  
1A  Y J E      (B.12a) 
d s
dt
 J Y J     (B.12b) 
where we used normalized quantities 
0
[t]
[t ]
Y
Y
Y , 
0
[t]
[t ]
J
J
J , etc. The simplified case treated 
in §3.2 can be retrieved by taking 0  . As previously, we anticipate that A  is related to 
PEC by  
[ ]dLog A
dt 
 E     (B.12c) 
with a constant  . We have 0  , the value of   for 0  , that corresponds to   
obtained above in §3.2. We take E  as exogenously defined and growing exponentially 
according to  0exp[ ]g t t  from a time 0 0t  . (B.12c) is directly transformed into
0 0
[ ] exp[ ] = exp exp[g ][ ]t t
t
A t dt t dt    E . To solve numerically the system (B.12), we go 
through the same process as above: we study E
Y
E
y   and E E  
Jj   which obey the system of 
equations (B.13) 
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 exp exp[ ]y gt j
g
E E    (B.13a) 
 E E Edj sy g jdt        (B.13b) 
At the beginning of the period, at time 0t , we suppose that the conditions of balanced growth 
are met: this implies that   00 +g
t s
t
j
y 
E
E
. But we also have    0 0 1y jt t E E . Thus, we have 
+gs  . In a last simplifying step, we define the temporal scale such that s equals 1. 
Figure A7 shows the evolution of E
Y
E
y   E E  
Jj   and A  for  = 0.5. On B, we see that all 
quantities scale like an exponential function of 
0
t
t
dt E  within less than a percent. The residual 
A  is such through our initial hypothesis (
0
[ ] exp[ ]
t
t
A t dt  E ). Figure A7b proves for  = 
0.5 that this hypothesis results in the expected behavior for E
Y
E
y   which was found to scale 
like 
0
exp[ ]
t
t
dt E  (see §3.2, especially Fig. 2). The parameter 0 5 .  in Fig. 7 was chosen to 
provide a factor 2.3 increase of E
Y
E
y   as in the case of the historical period 1820-2016. The 
behavior of yE  when   varies is very stable. Its limited range can be seen for example in 
Fig. B8a where the same functions as Fig. B7b are plotted, here for 1   with 1 0 0011  . . 
In Fig. B8b, we plot in semilog scale the production to energy ratio E
Y
E
y   for the two 
values of  : a minute gap, smaller than 3%, is found between the two curves. 
We performed simulations for other values of   in the range 0 to 1, with very minor changes 
in the results. This shows that the hypothesis 
0
[ ] exp[ ]
t
t
A t dt  E  with a constant   
correctly renders the historical period 1820-2016, whatever the value of   in Eq. (B.12a).  
If one would reproduce the final discussion of §3.2 in the more general case of a model 
including a capital factor J , similar conclusions would be reached. 
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Fig. B7. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. B7: Production to energy ratio E
Y
E
y  , the same ratio for its capital factor E E  
Jj   and 
the residual A , calculated for  = 0.5 according to Eq. (B.13). a: plotted on a linear scale as 
a function of time, normalized to 1
+g , the effective depreciation time. b: plotted on a 
semilog scale as a function of the total sum of PEC, normalized to PEC at 0t , with the same 
time unit as A7a.  
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Fig. B8. 
 
 
Fig. B8: Production to energy ratio E
Y
E
y  , the same ratio for its capital factor E E  
Jj   and 
the residual A , calculated for  = 1, according to Eq. (B.13). a: plot on a semilog scale as a 
function of the total sum of PEC, same abscissa unit (energy) as Fig. A7b. b: comparison of 
E
Y
E
y   on a semilog scale for the two values of  ; both curves are close to a straight line. 
 
References: 
25/08/2020 
30 
 
1 Cleveland, C. J., Costanza, R., Hall, C. A., & Kaufmann, R. Energy and the US economy: a 
biophysical perspective. Science 225, 890-897 (1984). 
2 Smil, V. Energy and civilization: a history (MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2017). 
3 Keeling, C. D. Is carbon dioxide from fossil fuel changing man's environment? Proc. Am. 
Phil. Soc. 114, 10-17 (1970). 
4 Sawyer, J. S. Man-made carbon dioxide and the “greenhouse” effect. Nature 239, 23-26 
(1972). 
5 Kos, C., Shammugam, S., Jülch, V., Nguyen, H.-T. & Schlegl, T. “Levelized Cost of 
Electricity Renewable Energy Technologies” (Fraunhofer Institute for Solar Energy Systems 
ISE, 2018; 
www.ise.fraunhofer.de/content/dam/ise/en/documents/publications/studies/EN2018_Fraunho
fer-ISE_LCOE_Renewable_Energy_Technologies.pdf ). 
6 A. Kätelhön, R. Meys, S. Deutz, S. Suh & A. Bardow Climate change mitigation potential 
of carbon capture and utilization in the chemical industry. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 116, 
11187-11194 (2019). 
7 “The European Green Deal” (European Commission, COM/2019/640 final, 2019; available 
at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/). 
8 Jacobson, M. Z., Delucchi, M. A., Bauer, Z. A., Goodman, S. C., Chapman, W. E., 
Cameron, M. A., Bozonnat, C., Chobadi, L., Clonts, H. A., Enevoldsen, P., Erwin, J. R., 
Fobi, S. N., Goldstrom, O. K., Hennessy, E. M., Liu, J., Lo, J., Meyer, C. B., Morris, S. B., 
Moy, K. R., O'Neill, P. L., Petkov, I., Redfern, S., Schucker, R., Sontag, M. A., Wang, J., 
Weiner, E. & Yachanin, A. S. 100% clean and renewable wind, water, and sunlight all-sector 
energy roadmaps for 139 countries of the world, Joule 1, 108-121 (2017). 
9 K. Hansen, C. Breyer & H. Lund, Status and perspectives on 100% renewable energy 
systems. Energy 175, 471-480 (2019). 
10 “BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2020”, 69th edition (British Petroleum, 2020; 
https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/business-sites/en/global/corporate/pdfs/energy-
economics/statistical-review/bp-stats-review-2020-full-report.pdf ). 
11 Masson-Delmotte, V., Zhai, P., Pörtner, H.-O., Roberts, D., Skea, J., Shukla, P. R., Pirani, 
A., Moufouma-Okia, W., Péan, C., Pidcock, R., Connors, S., Matthews, J. B. R., Chen, Y., 
Zhou, X., Gomis, M. I., Lonnoy, E., Maycock, T., Tignor, M. & Waterfield, T. (eds.), 
“Global Warming of 1.5°C. An IPCC Special Report on the impacts of global warming of 
1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas emission pathways, in 
the context of strengthening the global response to the threat of climate change, sustainable 
development, and efforts to eradicate poverty” (IPCC, 2018). 
12 Aghion, P. & Howitt, P. W. The economics of growth (MIT press, Cambridge MA, 2008). 
13 Jones, C. & Vollrath, D. Introduction to Economic Growth (WW Norton, New York, 
2013). 
14 Romer, D. Advanced macroeconomics, fourth edition (McGraw-Hill, New York, 2012). 
15 Ayres, R. U. & Miller, S. M. The role of technological change. J. Environ. Econ. 
Manag. 7, 353-371. (1980). 
16 Kümmel, R. The impact of energy on industrial growth. Energy 7, 189-203 (1982). 
17 Kümmel, R., Strassl, W., Gossner, A. & Eichhorn, W. Technical progress and energy 
dependent production functions. Zeitschrift für Nationalökonomie/Journal of Economics 45, 
285-311 (1985). 
18 Kahraman, Z. & Giraud, G. How Dependent is Growth from Primary Energy? An 
Empirical Answer on OECD Countries. In Energy & the Economy, 37th IAEE International 
Conference, June 15-18, 2014. International Association for Energy Economics. (2014). 
19 Costanza, R. Embodied energy and economic valuation. Science 210, 1219-1224 (1980). 
                                                 
25/08/2020 
31 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
20 Stern, D. I. Energy and economic growth in the USA: a multivariate approach. Energy 
economics 15, 137-150 (1993). 
21 Ayres, R. U. & Warr, B. The economic growth engine: How energy and work drive 
material prosperity (Edward Elgar Publishing, Northampton, MA, 2010).  
22 Keen, S., Ayres, R. U. & Standish, R. A Note on the Role of Energy in Production. Ecol. 
Econ. 157, 40-46 (2019). 
23 Malanima, P. The limiting factor: energy, growth, and divergence, 1820–1913. The 
Economic History Review 73, 486-512 (2020). 
24 Kander, A., Malanima, P. & Warde, P. Power to the people: energy in Europe over the last 
five centuries (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 2015). 
25 Fouquet, R. Lessons from energy history for climate policy: Technological change, 
demand and economic development. Energy Res. Soc. Sci. 22, 79-93 (2016). 
26 Maddison, A. The World Economy: Volume 1: A Millennial Perspective and Volume 2: 
Historical Statistics (OECD Development Center Studies, Paris, 2006). 
27 Internet resources (see also appendix A) : https://www.gapminder.org/data/ ; 
https://www.rug.nl/ggdc/historicaldevelopment/maddison ; 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/  
28 Court, V. "Énergie, EROI et croissance économique dans une perspective de long 
terme", thesis, Université Paris Nanterre (2016). 
29 Smil, V. Energy transitions: history, requirements, prospects (ABC-CLIO, 2010). 
30 Mankiw, N. G., Romer, D., & Weil, D. N. A contribution to the empirics of economic 
growth. Q. J. Econ. 107, 407-437 (1992). 
31 Piketty, T. Capital in the Twenty-First Century (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 
MA, 2014). 
32 Romer, P. M. Endogenous technological change. J. Political Econ. 98, 71-102 (1990). 
33 Kremer, M. Population growth and technological change: One million BC to 1990. Q. J. 
Econ. 108, 681-716 (1993). 
34 Perez, C. Technological revolutions and financial capital. (Edward Elgar Publishing, 
Northampton, MA, 2003). 
35 Harchaoui, S. & Chatzimpiros, P. Energy, nitrogen, and farm surplus transitions in 
agriculture from historical data modeling. France, 1882–2013. J. Ind. Ecol. 23, 412-425 
(2019). 
36 Benisty, H. & Bercegol H., submitted. 
37 Haberl, H., Wiedenhofer, D., Virág, D., Kalt, G., Plank, B., Brockway, P., Tomer Fishman, 
T., Hausknost, D., Krausmann, F., Leon-Gruchalsk, B., Mayer, A., Pichler, M., Schaffartzik, 
A., Sousa, T., Streeck, J. & Creutzig, F. A systematic review of the evidence on decoupling 
of GDP, resource use and GHG emissions, part II: synthesizing the insights. Environmental 
Research Letters, 15(6), 065003 (2020). 
38 Vadén, T., Lähde, V., Majava, A., Järvensivu, P., Toivanen, T., Hakala, E. & Eronen, J. T. 
Decoupling for ecological sustainability: A categorisation and review of research 
literature. Environmental Science & Policy 112, 236-244 (2020). 
39	Etemad,	B.	&		Luciani,	J.	World	Energy	Production	1800‐1985	(Droz,	Genève,	1991).	
40	Energy	Information	Administration	(US),	Annual	energy	review	2011	(Government	
Printing	Office,	2012).	
41	Fernandes,	S.	D.	et	al.,	Global	Biofuel	Use,	1850‐2000.	Global	Biogeochemical	Cycles	
21(2),	pp.1–15.	(2007).	
42	O'Connor,	P.	A.	&	Cleveland,	C.	J.	US	energy	transitions	1780–2010.	Energies	7(12),	
7955‐7993.	(2014).	
43	Kander,	A.	et	al.,	International	trade	and	energy	intensity	during	European	
industrialization,	1870–1935.	Ecol.	econ.	139,	33‐44	(2017).	
25/08/2020 
32 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
44	https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/	
45	https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gross_domestic_product	
46	The	processes	of	recalibrating	the	accounting	units	employ	thousands	of	economists	
worldwide.	Detailing	their	work	is	not	the	purpose	of	this	appendix.	
47	https://www.rug.nl/ggdc/historicaldevelopment/maddison/data/mpd_2013‐
01.xlsx,	cited	by	ref.	23.	
48	Bolt,	J.,	Inklaar,	R.,	de	Jong,	H.	&	Van	Zanden,	J.	L.	Rebasing	‘Maddison’:	new	income	
comparisons	and	the	shape	of	long‐run	economic	development.	GGDC	Research	
Memorandum,	174	(2018).	
49	https://www.rug.nl/ggdc/historicaldevelopment/maddison/releases/maddison‐
project‐database‐2018	
https://www.rug.nl/ggdc/historicaldevelopment/maddison/data/mpd2018.xlsx	
accessed	on	2020/06/10	
50	
https://www.rug.nl/ggdc/historicaldevelopment/maddison/data/mpd2018_region_da
ta.xlsx	accessed	on	2020/06/10	
51	Korotayev,	A.	V.	&	Tsirel,	S.	V.	A	spectral	analysis	of	world	GDP	dynamics:	Kondratieff	
waves,	Kuznets	swings,	Juglar	and	Kitchin	cycles	in	global	economic	development,	and	
the	2008–2009	economic	crisis.	Structure	and	Dynamics	4(1)	(2010).	
52	https://www.gapminder.org/	
53	https://github.com/Gapminder‐Indicators/gdppc_cppp/raw/master/gdppc_cppp‐
by‐gapminder.xlsx	provides	regional	and	world	data.	GDP	per	capita	for	individual	
countries	can	be	found	at	https://www.gapminder.org/data/	looking	for	Income	per	
person	(GDP/capita,	PPP$	inflation‐adjusted,	in	$2011	PPP).	See	also	information	about	
how	the	database	was	built	at	
https://www.gapminder.org/data/documentation/gd001/	;	web	sites	accessed	on	
2020/06/11.	
54	https://sites.fas.harvard.edu/~histecon/energyhistory/energydata.html	accessed	
2020/06/10	
